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Abstract 
This paper explores alternatives to the vVa1rasian Auctioneer for the allocation of 
resources in a pure exchange economy lacking a bilateral coincidence of wants. We have 
created three different computerized trading processes called BARTER, NUMERAIRE, 
and CARE (acronym for Computer Assisted Resource Exchange) . CARE is a "smart
market" in the sense that i t  contains computer algorithms that assist users in finding a 
coincidence of wants. The experimental results show that CARE outperforms BARTER 
and NUMERAIRE by extracting most of the gains from exchange with fewer contracts, 
lower volume, smaller utility swings, and lower variances in final utility positions. 
Trading in a Pure Exchange Economy without an 
Auctioneer: An Experimental Approach* 
David Porter Antonio Rangel 
1 Introduction
It is perhaps surprising that, up to quite recently, economists ha.ve paid rela­
tively little attention to the process of exchange itself. Closely analyzed, this 
process is found to involve inevitable costs and imperfections. It is as a.n at­
tempt to cope with these imperfections that the crucial institution of money
comes into existence (together with banks, credit cards and other puzzling 
phenomena. of our modern world) . . . 
J a.ck Hirschleifer in Price Theory and Applications ( 1976)
For more than two centuries, a.I least since the publication of Acla.m Smith's famous 
treatise, the virtues of voluntary Ira.cling have been unanimously understood .  Two or 
more parties exchange commodities if and only if there are gains from exchange for all of 
them. But it is also well established tha.t different rules or mechanisms of exchange will 
produce different outcomes (see Groves and Ledyard ( 1988) for a. survey) .  Furthermore, 
as the number of commodities to be exchanged and/or the number of incliviclua.ls in the 
market increases, the organiza.tiona.l problems can increase dramatically. 
The general question that this pa.per addresses is: given a. pure excha.nge economy, 
how do you implement a.n efficient trading medrnnism? There exists a. large literature 
in economics focusing on the existence of competitive equilibria [see for example, Arrow 
'We gratefully acknowledge the financial support from the Flight Projects Office of the Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory. All of the soft\i\'are design and irnpletnenta.t.ion are the \.York of \iVesley Bondville. \i\Tithout 
his infinite patience and expert progra1r11ning skills the Cassini Resource Exchange vvould not be a reality. 
\i\Te also thank .John Casani and Dennis l'via.l.son \Vho a.re Lhe driving force for this ne\v forn1 of science 
management, and especially John Ledyard for his in any con1n1ents and encouragen1ent. 
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and Debreu (1954) or Debreu (1959)]; but most of these results rarely address how 
equilibrium is achieved. The price formation process assumes the existence of a Walrasian 
Auctioneer that adjusts a price signal until a.II the buyer's a.nd seller's orders match. We 
a.re interested in alternatives to the vVa.lrasia.n Tatonnement auction mechanism. There
a.re several reasons for investigating new variations:
1. The Walra.sia.n process requires that the market is ca.lied at specific times to ag­
gregate orders and adjust prices until markets clear. In some applications, like the
market described in the next section, this is not practical.
2. The number of messages or iterations necessary to clear the market may be large.
Scarf (1960) has constructed examples of globally unstable equilibrium positions
to indicate some of the limitations to the scope of stability of the tatonnement
mechanism in a competitive environment.
3. Strategic underrevelation can cause problems with the convergence of the adjust­
ment rule and losses in efficiency [see Hurwicz (1972), Otani and Sicilian (1990)
and Bronfman et al. (1992)].
Before looking at possible alternatives it is important to keep in mind a few of the 
tasks that an adequate trading system must perform (these a.re the criteria. that we will 
use to evaluate the quality of trading institutions): 
1. The ma.in task for any exchange mechanism is to find Pareto-efficient reallocations.
If the economy is not at an efficient allocation, there exists a feasible utility increas­
ing reallocation of resources. If the mechanism is able to identify this reallocation,
send the proper signals to the individuals and coordinate the trades, then we will
say that it solves the problem of coincidence of wants.
11. A second desirable feature of the trading mechanism is to achieve Pareto improving
reallocations at low transaction costs. 'vVe define low transaction costs as a com­
bination of low trading volumes, few number of transactions and low exposure to
undesirable utility changes (e.g. utility reducing interim trades) .
The following techniques or institutions have been suggested i n  the past as alternative 
coordination devices to determine a coincidence of wants in a. pure exchange economy: 
1. Barter exchanges [see Edgeworth (1881)].
2. Use of one of the commodities in the exchange as a nurneraire [see \Valras (1954)].
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3 .  Introduction of money or fiat currency [see vVicksell (1961) and Hirshleifer (1976)]. 
'0/e suggest a fourth alternative: a smart or computer assisted market.
In a pure exchange economy, "money" is either one of the goods acting as a numeraire 
or tokens with no consumption value. McCabe (1989), in an experimental study on the 
use of fiat money, shows that this approach presents serious problems. If the dosing date 
of the market is common knowledge and there is not a.n overlapping generation, a. simple 
backward induction analysis of the situation yields no trading a.s the predicted outcome. 
McCabe found that, as time approaches the closing elate of the market, the volume of 
trade diminishes significantly (in some cases it collapses completely). 
The selection of one of the commodities a.s a numeraire has the potential to eliminate 
the problem described above concerning the use of fiat money. However, it introduces 
additional problems. In the numeraire case, a.gents buy and sell combinations of re­
sources in exchange for a certain amount of the numeraire good. The numeraire acts 
as a. bilateral accounting device. But it might be the case that not every individual has 
the same preferences over the numeraire commodity. For some a.gents this good may not 
be attractive. If those individuals want to execute a utility increasing transaction not 
involving the numeraire good, they must complete the trade, transact in the numeraire 
commodity, and thus engage temporarily in a utility reducing trade. This involves the 
risk of ending at an undesired allocation and might deter individuals from trading. 
This pa.per describes the development and testing of three different exchange insti­
tutions that attempt to solve the coordination problem in pure exchange economies. 
The first, called BARTER, is a computerized bilateral trading process. The second is a. 
variation of BARTER called NUlVIERAIRE. In this mechanism one of the resources is 
chosen a.s a. numeraire and all the trades must be expressed in terms of this commod­
ity. Hence individuals buy and sell combinations of resources and pay in the numeraire 
good. The final variation is ca.lied CARE (Computer Assisted Resource Exchange). This 
mechanism is a sophisticated variation of BARTER. Computer algorithms have been de­
veloped that use computing power to assist users finding a coincidence of wants (bilateral 
and multilateral reallocations of commodities ). 
A testbed has been designed to eva.luate the performance of the three institutions 
relative to the crit<er-ia,estahlished· above. An envircmment la.eking a bilateral coincidence
of wants has been crea.ted to test the abilities of the mechanisms to find utility improving 
reallocations of resources. 
To elate there exists very little empirical evidence about the performance of pure 
exchange economies; especially in the absence of a vValrasian Auctioneer. Albin and 
Foley (1992) develop models to study the performance of bilateral resource exchange in 
the absence of an auctioneer. They study how individual agents would broadcast costly 
messages to indicate their desire to trade. Their computer simulation shows that even 
when the cost of finding trading pa.rtners is significant, the efficiency of bilateral trading 
systems is high. The approach we take is somewhat different. We have designed real 
institutions1 and we use human subjects to test the performance of the mechanisms.
The problem described in this paper was generated by a specific application. The 
motivation for the project is described in the next section. Section 3 describes the 
common features of the three institutions.(the basic algebra of exchange) and· the specific
rules and procedures for each mechanism. Section 4 contains the parameters of the
testbed and the experimental procedures. Section 5 presents the experimental results. 
We state our conclusions in Section 6. 
2 The Cassini Mission: A Motivation for the Prob­
lem 
NASA is planning to launch, in 1997, the Cassini mission to Sa.turn. The Ca.ssini mission 
consists of a spacecra.ft carrying a suite of scientific instruments tha.t will orbit Saturn 
and deliver a probe to Titan, one of Saturn's satellites. The mission is being managed 
by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (.JPL) . In the past, the allocation of resources2 to 
the instruments was clone centrally at the project office. However, unlike previous JPL 
missions, Cassini is essentially opera.ting under a fixed price commitment from Congress. 
This fa.ct has motivated a radically different approach to the management of the science 
instruments. The project has decentralized the instrument resource allocation process 
through the use of a fixed commitment policy [see Ledyard (1991)]. 
In genera.I terms, the fixed commitment policy specifies that all the resources avail­
able for science instrument development be distributed at the beginning of the instru­
ment development phase. Every team receives a vector of resources and is responsible 
for developing an instrnment that meets specified minimum quality and performance 
requirements.3
The process of the initial assignment to the science teams is clone with incomplete 
and a.symmetric information a.nd is likely to produce an inefficient initial allocation. 
During the development process new information enters the system. The science tea.ms 
learn with more precision about the resource profiles tha.t a.re required for the successful 
1 A variation of CARE is being in1ple1nented at NASA for the exchange of resources \vi thin the 
CASSIN! i\.fission. The n1arket opens in 1993. See the next section for 111ore details.
2 An allocation of resources includes a1nounts of n1a.ss1 po\ver and data to be provided by the spacecraft 
during the mission and a profile of funding in different fiscal yea.rs to pay for instrument development. 
3The n1issio11 consists of 1:3 science inst.run1ents, a probe and a spacecraft.
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development of their science instrument. 4 As a consequence of this learning process an 
instrument team might want to change its allocation. 
A market has been provided to soften the impact of the initial allocation on the 
efficiency of the system and the quality of the science instruments. A science team that 
voluntarily wants to change its allocation can trade with other teams using the market. 
The market is a computerized barter exchange called the Cassini Resource Exchange 
(CRE). CRE is a variation of the CARE mechanism described in this paper. It resides 
on an international computer network and can be accessed by members of the instrument 
teams. The market is now open. 
In the Cassini application an extra feature has been included in the market. The 
allocations given to the science teams includes funding and "physical" resources like 
mass, power and data. The initial allocation determines a set of design parameters 
for the spacecraft . Examples of the parameters are: center of gravity and moment of 
inertia related to mass allocations and thermal constraints related to power consumption. 
There exists an externality problem beca.use when two instruments trade some of these 
parameters may change. The instrument manager at JPL must decide if the trade is 
acceptable and determine, if necessary, compensation for the affected agents. 
3 The Market Mechanisms 
We have created three computerized institutions to trade resources in a standard multi­
dimensional pure exchange economy. The institutions are BARTER, NUMERAIRE, and 
CARE. 5 Although they have different rules and procedures, they share a core of basic 
features that we call the basic algebra of exchange. These common features a.re described 
in the next subsection. The last three subsections describe the particular characteristics 
of each mechanism. 
3.1 The Basic Algebra of Exchange
Let S = {l, 2, . . .  , n} denote the set of resource holders in the economy and G =
{l, 2, . . .  , m} the set of trada.ble commodities. Every individual possesses an initial
allocation in every commodity. Person i's in itial allocation is denoted by the vector 
wf = ( wf,, . .. wfnJ , where wfk represents the initial amount of commodity k that i
owns. The market opens at a. time t0 and closes at a time t*. This is common knowl­
edge among the resource holders. At any tinw t, incliviclua.l i's allocation is denoted as: 
4During the develop1nent phase the science tea.ins not only learn ¥-'ith n1ore precision their preferences 
over design resources; but they n1ust also adapt to changes in the state-of-the-art technology. 
5ti.1anuals1 soft,vare, and documentation can he obtained fron1 the authors. 
Wi(t) = (w1;(t), ... , Wm;(t)). At any time the allocation of every individual is public; i.e.,
there is complete information about who owns what. 
The current allocation of any participant changes with every trade. There is a con­
straint on the range of allocations that a.re permissible in the system (and thus in the 
range of trades tha.t an individual can execute ): 
[Rl] For every t* 2: t 2: t0 Wi(t) 2: 0
i.e., negative a1locations in any dimension are forbidden and a trade is to be performed
if and only if all the parties have enough resources to pay for their share of the trade. 
There is no short-selling. 
The total amount of resources is fixed in time. totj = I:, w_ji is the total amount
of commodity j in the economy. tot = (tot1, ... ,totm) describes the dimensions of the 
commodity space. 
If an individual wants to change her distribution of resources, she needs to trade with 
other individuals. Users list proposed trades, called bids, on the system in the hope that 
some other user will accept them. A hid can he represented as a vector in Rm defined as
Xk = (xk1, ... , Xkm)· A bid contains the following information:
1 .  k E N is the bid number. If two bids a.re different then they have different bid
numbers. Two bids a.re different if they were placed at a different time or by a 
different person. In particular, if Xkl, Xkz k2 > kl then Xk2 was placed after Xkl;
i.e., the index k increases with time. 
2. Given a bid Xb if Xkj 2: 0 for some j E G then Xkj represents the amount of good j
requested by the trade. If "'k.i < 0 then Xkj is the amount of commodity j offered.
Let B(t) = { Xka, Xkb, ... , Xkr} be the finite set that contains all the bids at any given
time t. The bid Xk E B( t) iff Xk was placed at a time t' < t and Xk has not been deleted6
at a time t' '.".'. t. At any time t, a. participant can only accept bids that were not placed 
by him. 
If a bid is accepted a. trade occurs. The ··softwai'e exec-utes the desired transfer of
resources and updates all the relevant information. Note that an individual accepts a bid 
if and only if he wants to perform the trade described in the bid. 
6To delete a bid is to retire it from the set of bids that can be accepted. A bid is deleted if: a) the bid
\Vas accepted1 or, b) the individual \vho placed the bid retires it fron1 the system before it is accepted. 
Some rules describing this point are given belo-.,v.
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Let Ow(xk) : B --> S be a function that maps every bid into the person who placed
it. 
There is a natural rule concerning the process of deleting bids: 
[R2] if Ow(xk) = i then only i is able to delete Xk and i can delete Xk at tiff xk has
not been traded at a t' < t.
This rule is necessary to ensure consistency in the philosophy of voluntary trading. A 
trade is to be reversed or nullified if and only if all the parties involved in the operation 
agree to do so. A trade Xk can be reversed by executing the opposite operation: -Xk· 
[Rl] imposes a constraint on the kinds of bids that can belong to B(t). If Xk E B(t)
and Ow(xk) = i, then w;(t) + xk 2:. O; i.e., i cannot place a bid if he does not possess
enough resources to pay for the trade. This follows logically from [Rl] and the definition 
of B(t). 
B;(t) = {xkjxk E B(t) and Ow(xk) = i} is the set that contains the standing bids of
i at time t. Note that UiEsB;(I) = B(l).
3.2 BARTER
This mechanism, as its name indicates, is a bilateral exchange process. No additional 
constraints are added to the procedures described in the previous subsection. Every 
individual can place as many bids as she desires. The only constraint is that she has 
enough resources to cover the trade described by her bids. 
3.3 NUMERAIRE
In this institution, before the opening of the market, one of the commodities is designated 
as the numeraire. The same commodity is used as the numera.ire for the entire operational 
life of the market. Hence, individuals buy and sell combinations of resources and pay or 
are pa.id in the numeraire good. 
NUMERAIRE provides a bid-ask spread for every dimension. Appendix C contains 
examples of different computer screens and data formats for rna.rket da.ta. for BARTER, 
NUMERAIRE and CARE. 
It is important to realize that strictly speaking NUMERAIRE is a subset of BARTER. 
Every NUMER.AIRE bid and acceptance can be executed in BARTER but the opposite 
is not true. 
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3.4 CARE: Algorithms and Underlying Principles
The concepts of placing, a,ccepting and deleting bids are the fundamental features of the 
market; the cornerstones that make possible the voluntary exchange of resources. Never­
theless, there are two severe obstacles that may impede the performance of the market: 
the difficulty in finding a coincidence of wants and a,n excessive amount of information 
processing. As the number of resources in the economy increases, the probability of find­
ing a utility increasing bilateral transaction decrease. Because an individual must take 
into account all the possible trades that he could execute in order to select the best op­
tion in the market, the limited capability of the human mind might impede the optimal 
performance of the market. 
CARE dea.ls with tliese problems. A smart unit is a procedure or algorithm that 
takes the information available in the system and transforms it into a specific format. It 
provides every user with a set of tools that facilitates the search of information in the 
message space. 
SMART UNIT I: The Set of Potential Bids 
At any time t, the set of i's standing bids B;(t) can be transformed into the set B£(t) 
that contains the set of all the potential bids that i is offering. Note for example, that 
if i E 8 is offering two bids xk and x11 then i is willing to reach any of the following
allocations : 
!. Wj + Xk 
II. Wj + X]i 
lll. Wj + Xk + X]i. 
The process to generate Bi( t) i s  given by: 
1 .  Let Bi(t) = {CIC <::: B;(t), C is not the empty set}. This set contains all the
subsets of i's bids tha.t could be traded simultaneously. 
2. Given C = { x1, x2, ... , x111} s .t .  Xj E Rm, L:;(C) : C --> Rm is a function given by
sum(C) = LcXk· Let Bi'(t) = {xk lxk = sum(C) for all C E  Bf(t)}. This step
combines all the subsets above into one bid.
3. Let B;"(t) = {xk lxk E B;'(t) and Wj + xk 2" O}. This step verifies tha.t [Rl] is not
violated by any combination of bids.
4. Let B;'(t) = { xk lxk E B;"(t) and tot 2 Wj + xk} · This last step excludes bids
that are asking for an amonnt of resonrces greater than the quantity available in
the economy. It eliminates non-feasible trades. In the example a.hove Hi(t) = 
{xbxh,xk + x11}. 
The purpose of these algorithms is: 
(a) The user is able to verify how his standing bids and their contingencies map 
into possible final allocations. 
(b) The set Bf(t) is required for the generation of chains (a procedure described 
below) .  
SMART UNIT II: The Set of Potential Trades 
At any given time an individual i E S is faced with a set of potential trades that is
the result of all the possible combinations of subsets of bids of the other players. 
Let C;(t) = {xklxk E B.j(t) for sornej # i}, the set containing all the proposed trades
facing i. C;(t) can be transformed into F;"(y), the set that contains all the possible
allocations that i can reach as a result. of accepting a feasible combination of bids by
other players. 
The procedure to generate this set is the following: 
1 .  Let C;(t) ={GIG� C;(t ) and if xbx1i E Ci(t) then Ow(xk) # Ow(x11)}. This
set generates subsets of C:;( t) that do not contain more than one bid per player. It
is important that two bids of a same player are not included because Bj(t) already 
contains all the possible combinations of bids that j is offering. 
2. Let Di(t) = {xklxk = sum(G) for all GE Ci(t)}.
3 . Let Ei(t) = {xklxk = E Dj(t) and w; +wk 2: 0}. This step eliminates allocations
that individual i cannot afford.
4. Let F;(t) = {xklxk E E";(t) and for all Xk E F;*(t) there does not exist Xh E F;*(t)
such that w;(t) + x11 2: w;(t) + xk and for some commodity j, (w;(t) + xh)j > 
(wi(t) + xk ) j} . This operation excludes a bid Xk if there exists a bid Xh that is a
strictly better for i than Xk·
The purposes of this procedure are: 
a) A user looking for a favorable trade is presented with a. "purified" set of all possi­
ble final allocations. It is then straightforward to choose the trade in F((t) that 
rnaxi111izes the user prcfere11ces. 
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b) It assists i in generating his bidding strategy because it contains all the information
about other individuals' stated preferences or proposed trades. 
c) F((t) is used in the generation of the cha.in algorithm that we will discuss next.
SMART UNIT III: Chains 
The concept of cha.ins is most easily introduced with an example. Assume X1 = 
(10,0,-10), x2 = (0,-10,15), x3 = (-10,10,-5), Ow(x1) = Wes, Ow(x2) = Frank 
and Ow(x3) = Tom. Furthermore, assume that these a.re the only bids in the market. 
The reader can easily verify that x1 + x2, x1 + X3, and Xz + X3 a.re all different from 0
implying that no one in the economy is able to improve his allocation through bilateral 
trading with another resource holder. Nevertheless, x1 + X2 + X3 = 0. This is a perfect
example of a lack of bilateral coincidence of wants. The sum of wants equals to the sum 
of offers (see Figure 1 below) .
[Figure l about here] 
Given Xk E B7(t) and x11 E F;"(t), the two element set {xk.xh} is an i-cha.in if 
Xk + Xj = 0. C h.j(t) = { { Xk, x11} j { Xk, Xh} is an i-chain as defined above } . To generate
this set i t  i s  necessary to take every potential bid that i is offering and add it to every 
potential trade that i is facing. If they add up to zero then the cha.in is included in
Chi(t). If Xk + x11 :C: 0 then for a subset of the a.gents the sum of the offers is greater
than the sum of the wants. In this case xk + xh E F(( t) (the set of potential trades
facing i) for every individua.! i. Anyone can pick up the surplus by executing the trade.
CARE: Rules and Procedures 
The three smart units described above a.re algorithms included to enhance the perfor­
mance of the market. As a mechanism, these smart units are a group of simple operations 
over sets. But although their definition and interpretation present no conceptual prob­
lems, their implementation into a computer program is not so trivial 
CARE easily generates the first two procedures. The chain algorithm is the unit 
that presents some implementation problems. The challenge is not the complexity of the 
operations required to generate the chain-set but the number of computations. Let a 
market have m resource holders placing n bids. The number of computations required is 
approximately (for n :C: 2): 
n n.!(2'n - l)k� (n - k)!k! 
This number increases exponentia.!ly in both n and m. 
CARE is the combination of BARTER, the three smart units and a. few rules regarding 
the process of placing ancl deleting bids in the market. The set of rules described below 
JO
reduces the number of bids that an agent can place and thus it reduces the number of 
combinations necessary to generate chains. These rules force individuals to act in a way 
that enhances orderly convergence to a trade. These rules are generalizations of the bid­
ask-spread improvement rule found in the double-auction mechanism. \Ve selected these 
rules because the double-auction mechanism has been found to generate high efficiencies 
in the laboratory [see Smith (1982)]. The rules are: 
RULE I: THE PLACEMENT O F  BIDS 
a) At any given time any individual may have only one standing bid in the market (the
purpose of this rule is to reduce the number of computations ). 
b) At the opening of the rna.rket, every individual i has a default bid Zj = 0.
c) Any person can modify his standing bid but he must comply with the following
IMPROVEMENT RULE: 
Let x be the standing bid and y be the new bid. y is acceptable if and only if
� (y > x). 
i.e., to ask for more in one dimension the individual must reduce the request in
another dimension. 
RULE II: UPDATIN G THE S YSTEM 
a) Every time there is a trade all the bids are set into the default bid (zi = 0).
b) Every time a bid changes, CARE updates all the information (smart units, account­
ing, etc.) using the new bid information. 
RULE III: TRADING 
a) Any person can accept at any time a bid from the set of potential trades facing him
or a chain from her i-cha.ir set. 
4 Experimental Design
4.1 Parameters of the Testbed
Our objective is to con1pare the performance of the three market institutions described 
above. This requires the use of a common testbed. 
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We create a six-person-three-commodity pure exchange economy. We generate the 
preferences with induce values [see Smith (1976)] by providing monetary payments to 
subjects proportional to their fina.l utility. The a.mount paid is equal to the value of their 
respective pa.yolf functions a.t the allocation held when an experimental period ends. The 
induced value functions that we use are a combination of a Cobb-Douglas utility function 
and a step function in one of the dimensions. Table 1 shows the initial allocation and 
payoff functions of three types of subjects. Individuals 1 and4 are called type one traders; 
2 and 5 are type two traders and :3 and 6 are type three traders. Notice that if agents 
face positive price vectors, the type 1 traders do not buy or sell A, type 2 traders do not 
deal in B, and type 3 traders do not exchange C. 
[Table l about here] 
The system has a competitive equilibrium (C.E.J. The payoffs are normalized so that 
every individual makes 7 dollars a.t the C:.E. and zero dollars a.t the initial a.llocation. 
Table 2 contains the C:.E. prices with commodity C: a.s the numera.ire. Table 3 describes
the competitive equilibrium transactions for each trader type. Notice that the C.E. 
reallocation cannot be reached using only bilateral utility increasing trades. All the 
feasible utility increasing trades take the form of chains. This is the most important 
feature of the design because we want to test. the relative performance of the mechanism 
under a severe coincidence of wants problem. Note that if the CE allocation is to be 
represented by one trade, this trade must b<e executed in the form of a chain.
[Table 2 and Table :J about here]
4.2 Experimental Procedures
Subjects were recruited from the unclcrgra.cluate population at Caltech. A prerequisite 
to be in the experiment wa.s to have participated in a tra.ining session the day prior to 
the experiment. In the training session the individuals learned the market procedures of 
the mechanism being test.eel and the strncture of the experiment. They were familiarized 
with the software and received their initial a1lorntions and payoff functions. The subjects 
received five dollars for participating in the training session. 
Every mechanism was tested for 12 experimental periods. An experimental period is 
structured as follows: 
1. At the beginning of the period every individual is given her respective initial allo­
cation.
2. At t = 0 the market opens.
3 .  At t = 20 minutes the market closes. For every player, the payoff for the experi­
mental period is determined by Lhe final allocation of tha.t period. 
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A given group of six individuals participated in four consecutive experimental periods 
of a given mechanism. Hence, 18 different people participated in the testing of each 
institution for a total of twelve periods per institution. 
The players' total earnings for participating in the experiment is equal to the sum of 
the payoffs in the four experimental periods plus the five dollars for the training session. 
The subjects were paid at the encl of the experiment. 
Note the following points about the information distribution in the system: 
l. Although the players might know the identity of the other players, all the commu­
nication is clone through computer terminals.
2. The only private information is the individual's payoff function.
The instructions consisted of two parts. The first part was a description of the 
experiment. Appendix A contains a copy of a typical package handed to a participant. 
A set of instructions, payoff sheet. computer passwords, and login instructions and an 
accounting sheet was included. The second part was necessary to teach the subjects how 
to use the software. A fifteen minute demonstration pins a, ten minute practice period 
for the subjects was provided. 
5 Experimental Results
In this section we analyze the results of the experiments described in Section 4. 'vVe
have divided the presentation in four subsections clea1ing with trading efficiency, trad­
ing dynamics and final a1locations, and competitive equilibrium predictions. The lost 
subsection provides a summary of the experimental results. 
5.1 Efficiency Measures
We look at two possible measures of efficiency. The first one is the coefficient of resource 
utilization ( CRU) [see Debren ( 19.51 J]. The other one is the Euclidean distance between
a point in the commodity space and the competitive equilibrium allocation defined by 
the point. 
1:3 
5.1.1 CRU: a measure of resource utilization. 
Let x = (x1, . . .  , xn) be an a1location for the economy, x* the allocation for which we
want to compute the CRU , pe(x*)the CE-price vector at x* and tot the dimensions of
the Edgeworth Box. The CRU is of the economy calculated as follows: 
where 
subject to: 
CRU(x*) = V(x) pe(x*) · tot 
n 
V(x) =min L pe(x*) ·xi 
x . ·1=1
i) ui(x) = u'(x*)
ii) x :':'. x*
[u'(-) is the utility of person i.] 
Tims, the CRU is a measure ol' the maximum value of resources, weighted by the CE­
price vector, that are being wasted i11 the economy. Notice that the CRU takes values 
between 0 and 1 ,  and that the CRU is equal to one only at a Pareto optimal allocation. 
A low value of CRU implies that valuable resources are being wasted because we can find 
a reallocation in which everybody stays on the same indifference curve without utilizing 
all the available commodities. 
Figme 2 shows the mean per period CRU for each mechanism. Notice that if the 
CRU is one, then all the gains from exchange have been extracted and the value of the 
net gains from exchange (NGFE) would be one. \\le define the net gains from exchange 
for a particular allocation as the percentage of the gains from exchange that have been 
extracted. It is calculated as follows: 
TO' l c·:p(J - ]111't1' al (_:nu\, ., E 
1' 111a , ''(,F = -----------� 
0.15 
where 0. 1 5  is the maximum possible increase of the CRU. Notice that each trading system 
results in high levels of the CRU. That should be·expected -since the CRU at the initial
allocation is 0.85. From Figure 2 it is clear that. each institution is extracting some gains
from exchange. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
Res11Jt 1: Compared to BARTER and CARE, the NUMERAIRE mechanism results in
the largest a.mo·u.nt of resource waste. 
Support: 















A paired comparison of the CARE and BAHTER mechanisms against NUMERAIRE 
yields a t-statistic of 1.91 (p-value of .06). 
Result 2: There is no change in the CRU .for CARE and BARTER over time.
Support: 
The average CRU for periods 1 and 2 versus periods 3 and 4 is provided below: 
Mechanism A vet·age CRU Periods 1-2 Average CRU Periods3-4
CARE .99 .99 
BARTER .98 .98 
NUMERAIRE .95 .9:3 
5.1.2 Euclidean distance to the C.E.
As an extension of the notation used above, let x"(x* ) denote the CE-allocation deter­
mined by x*. The new measure of elficiency denoted by D(x') is given by: 
D(x*) is equal to zero only at a Pa.reto optimal allocation. A bigger value of D(x* ) 
indicates a lower efficiency. The va.lue of the coefficient at the initial allocation is 4 72. 
Figure 3 shows the time series for the coefficient. 
[Figure :J about here]
Result 3: The distance-eJJiciency measurc:ments for CA RE indicate a much higher distance­
efficiency than BARTE!? ot NUMERA THE.
Support: See Figure il.
Result 4: For CARE, the vaiue of D{x") impmves with time. The D(x*)-time series for 
BARTER and NUMERAIRE do not e:rhibit any clear trends. 
Support: See Figure 3. 
In our experiments each measure provides the same ordinal ranking of the institutions. 
In decreasing level of efficiency the ranking is: CARE, BARTER., and NUMERAIRE. But 
if we consider net gains from exchange and distance efficiency, CARE shows significantly
larger cardinal values. 
5.2 Trading Dynamics and Final Allocations
Although the three mechanisms exhibit strong tendencies not to waste resources, the 
final allocation and the trading paths a.re quite different. 
In ea.ch mechanism, when a tra.cle occurs ea.ch party to the trade moves to a new level 
of utility. Figure '1 shows distri bution of 1.he changes in utility per trade for ea.ch trading
mechanism. The boxplots show the median , inter and out.er quartiles, along with the 10
and 90 percent outlyers. 
[Figure 4 about here] 
Result 5: In both the BARTER a.nd 1\TUMERAIRE trading mechanisms agents engage in
a significant number of utility reducing trades during the trading period. The distribution 
tightens with experience, but large changes in utility are required to reach the final alloca­
tion. In contrast, CARE allows traders lo reach an efficient allocation without exposing 
themselves to large swings in utility (most trades are utility increasing for CARE). 
Support: See Figure 4.
In terrns of final utility positions we find that each mechanism beha,ves quite differ­
ently. Table '1, provides the final utility (earnings position) for each of the trader types.
Reca.11 that, a.t the competitive equilibri um, profits should be equalized at seven dollars 
across trader types. 
[Table 4 about here] 
From Table 4 we obtain the following results: 
Result 6: Each of the e.uhange m.echanisms has wide ranges in profits for each trader
type. The largest spreads occ11» in NUMERA lRE and then BARTER. 
Result 1: Each. of the mechanism.s end up at profit posihons by trader type that are
significantly d�fferent. For NUMERAIRE, net suppliers of the mimernfre, at the C.E., 
fare significantly better than net demanders of the numeraire. 
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Result 8: Each of the mechanisms ei:hibits significant changes across periods. The
profit range tightens and the profit differences across types decreases. CARE exhibits 
the strongest tendency towards pro.fit equality over time. 
Each mechanism takes a very different trading path. It is also clear from results 5-8 
that each institution generates a different final allocation. In order to organize the data, 
and take into a,ccount these differences, two specific models are proposed. ' The first, 
and most obvious model, is the competitive equilibrium prediction. The second uses 
the strategic Nash equilibrium prediction of underrevelation of demand and supply [see 
Hurwicz (1972) and Otani and Sicilian (1990)].
5.3 Competitive Equilibriurn Predictions
5.3.1 Allocations
For our experimental testbed the Competitive Equilibrium provides a precise prediction 
of the final allocation that should he achieved. Hence, it also provides predictions on the 
direction each trader type should lllOve in order to reach the C.E. 
5.3.1.1 Final Trader Positions
In Figure 5 we show the deviation from the CE of the final allocations for each of the 
trading mechanisms and trader type. Recall that type 1 traders only trade in goods B 
and C, type 2 trades in goo els A and C, and type 3 in goods A and B .  
[Figure !) about here]
From Figure 5 we obtain the following result: 
Result 9: In all the trading 1nechanisms !he traders move in the direction of the C.E. Ex­
perience also rrwves the allocations clo, u lo the C.E. in all the mechanisms. However, 
CARE provides the smallest devialions fmm C.E. and NUMERAIRE the largest. The 
dispersion of 01dcomes around !.he C. E. are large for all the mechanisms. 
Result 10: The final allocations are different by trader type and mechanism with un­
der revelation by type 8 trades in CA RE and type 1 traders in NUJ\1ERAIRE. BARTER 
shows no major underrevdation properlies. 
Support: See Table :3. It describes the mean deviation from the predicted allocation at
the CE by trader type and rnechanism. 
[Table .S about here} 
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5.3.1.2 Relative Prices
The following regression was estimated for each trading mechanism: 
C jt = o:Ajt + (3Bjt + E 
where C;t is the C amount prov.ided in trade j in period t. The equilibrium predictions 
are: o:= - 1 . 72; (3= - 1 .66. Table 6 supplies the estimates of o: and (3. 
[Table 6 about here] 
Result 11: We cannot reject that the BARTER and CARE prices are equal to the com­
petitive prices; they arc significantly different .fi>r NUMERA lRE. 
Support: 





(-1.:3:),- 1 . 95) 
( -1 .70,-2.06) 
( -t.:lll,- 1 .42) 
(3 
( - 1 .22,-1 .60) 
(-1.47,- 1 .91) 
(- 1 .:30,- 1 . 50) 
The selection of a numeraire good significantly reduces the relative prices in the 
NUMERAIRE mechanism and thus provides profits to those who are net sellers at the 
competitive price. Indeed, this implies that there is potential underrevelation on the part 
of the net sellers of the numeraire. The time series of trades can be found in Appendix 
B .  
5.3.2 Volume of Trade
In order to reach the competitive equilibrium predicted allocation a certain volume of 
trading must occur. Table G describes the volume of trading at the C.E. allocations and 
the average volume of trading in each mechanism. 
[Table 7 about here]
Result 12: In terms of the averaqe ool11me of trading, CARE is closest to the C.E.
prediction. However, for every dimension and m.echanism the volume of frade is greater 
than the CE-predicted volume of trade. 
Support: See Table 7. 
18 
Result 13: The composition of the volume of tmde is different across the mechanisms.
Since good C was selected as the numeraire, it shows significant volume in the NU-
1'11ERAIRE mechanism. However, the volmne of trade is lower for good, A and B with 
the NU1'11ERAIRE. The total volume of trade is lowest with CARE. 
Support: See Table 7. 
Result 14: There is a significant increase in the volume of trade over time with NU­
li1ERAIRE, but not for BARTER or CARE. 
Support: The average volumes for the last period of the experiments are provided in 
Table 8. 
[Table 8 about here]
Recall, with CARE individuals can execute chains. Figure 6 shows the distribution 
of contracts in terms of cbain behavior (I-chains are bihiteral trades, 2-chains are three 
person trades, etc. ). 
Result .15. With CARE, over 40% of the trades are.'] or 4 person chains. However the
majority of trades are bilateral. 
Support: See Figure Ci.
[Figure (i about here]
5.4 Experiment Summary: What Was Learned From the Ex­
periments? 
The experiments were designed to test the most basic trading mechanisms in an environ­
ment where there is a. significant. la.ck ol' a, coincidence of wants. In addition, the exponents 
provided a. method to determine a prool' of concept for a new and untested "smart mar­
ket" - CARE. First, the CARE system posed no major learning issues for participants .
In  terms of the experirnental results CARE consistently out.performed BARTER and 
NUMERAIRE in terms of gains from exchange, transactions volume, smooth changes in 
utility positions, and relative profitability of traders. Thus, we have developed an insti­
tution that holds the promise of coping with the cost and im.perfections associated with 
pure ba.rter-type exchanges. In the process of comparing the performance of the basic 
trading institutions, we have found that the use of a numeraire good as a bilateral coordi­
nation and account device hampers bar1.er exchange clue to the strategic underrevelation 
abilities of those who placed a relatively high use value on the numeraire. 
6 Conclusions 
To date very little evidence exists on the performance of barter and numeraire trading 
institutions. This pa.per fills that gap by supplying a.n experimental examination of these 
mechanisms in a. pure exchange setting in which utility increasing trades must. occur in 
three-person, three good transaction cha.ins. Since the ma.in problem facing a .n institution 
in a. pure exchange environment is solving the coincidence of wants problem, we created 
a computer-assisted pure exchange trading mechanism (CARE) that determines trading
cha.ins and allows users to execute combinations of bilateral trades simultaneously. 
The data. from our experiments demonstrate that although these mechanisms tend 
to exhaust the gains from exchange: they extract these gains in entirely different ways. 
CARE and BARTER are simila.r but CARE has fewer contracts and volume, lower utility 
swings from trades, and lighter profit rlistrib11tions. NUl'vlERAIRE does not provide the 
type of coordination needed to srnootli the market. Those individua.ls for which the 
numeraire does not provide direct utility do much better than those individuals who a.re 
net dema.nders of the numeraire. 
The motivation for our investigation is the market established by the Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory ( JPL) for the exchange of Cassini mission resources ( ma.ss, power, data. rate,
a.nd instrument development funding) among science teams. In that market trades will
likely involve series of science teams exchanging packages of resources (they will be mul­
tilateral a1locations). The algorithms and procedures used in the CARE mechanism ha.ve 
been implernentecl into the Cassini Rcsomce Excliange. 
Computer assisted markets, such as CARE, are likely to emerge in the future. The 
allocation of resources internal to a firm and across divisions are potential candidates 
for such a. mechanism. Immediate applications could include the market for the swa.ps 
of financial instruments (e.g. interest rate and foreign exchange) and the trading of
packages of environmental emissions. As more and more applications utilizing market 
mechanisms to solve resource allocation prohlerns are brought forward, new and improved 
institutions will be required. The power of the computer a.nd the development of fa.st 





a. Timing of the Experiment
This experiment lasts for two hours . Dlll'ing these two hours we are going to run fonr
identical periods. Every period will nm for twenty minutes. 
b. Description of the Experiment
The following is  a description of a trading period. (Recall that you are going to
participate in four trading periods.)
You have been given an initial allocation in three fictitious commodities. These com­
modities a.re labeled: A, B, and C. There are five other participants in the experiment.
Each one of them has been given an initial allocation in these three commodities.
Your package contains a payoff function that translates your allocation of resources
into payoffs convertible ill Lo lJ. S. dollars. You make money by increasing  the value of your
payoff function. The only way to do this is to make trades with the other participants.
Your payoff table is your own private information. It. is very important t.ha.t. you do not
reveal your payoff table to the other participants.
How do you trade? You can make trades with other participants using your computer. 
In a few moments the experimenter will show you how to use the system.
All the trades must be expressed in terms of the commodity C. Hence you buy 
combina.tions of commodities fl and B and pay lll C and sell combinations of ;l and B
and get paid in C. 
Example: 
1 .  BUY A 
\\Tant 10 A 




:3. SELL A AND BUY B
Sell A for C








The program restricts you to hold only non negative allocations in every commodity. 
The structure of a trading period is the following: 
Minute Description 
0 The market opens. Each participant is given their initial allocation of 
A, B, and C .  
0-20 Participants place bids and make trades. 
20 The market closes. No more bids are to be placed or trades to be 
performed . Your payoff for the period is fixed by your final allocation. 
The market is reinitialized to yonr origina1 a1loca.tion. 
Your earnings for the experiment are tlw sum of the individual payoffs for the four 
periods plus a five dollars bonus f'or participating.
c. Remark 
This experiment runs under the honor system. You are not allowed to show your 
payoff function to the other players, or to collude, or to form cartels, etc. 
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Appendix B 
Notes: Trades are listed as a 3 tuple (A,B,C) where a negative number is the amount 
offered in the trade and a positive number is the amount received from the trade. The 
numbers in the graphs correspond to the period the contra.ct was made and the line in 








1 - Period 1
2 - Period 2
3 - Period 3
4 - Period 4
CE Price
Appendix C 
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Date Bidder x B• Con 
--------------------------------------------------------
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12:09 22Nov92 five 1 1 1 -10.00 30.00 
12:os 22Nov92 four 1 2 2 50.00 -56.00 
12:09 22tfov92 one 1 2 2 100.00 -130.00 
12:10 22Nov82 five 1 2 2 -10,00 28.00 
12;10 22Nov92 three 1 0 0 50,00 -50,00 
12:10 22Nov92 four 1 3 3 70.00 -90.00 
12:10 22Nov92 one 1 3 3 50,00 -58,00 
.U:.11__2_2BQ.\!S_2_ two 1 1 1 -25 00 5_Q,QQ 
�����lhistor!J l!oetions/lhelp) 
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Table 1 .  Testbed Parameters 
Initial Allocation 




10 200 <100 
200 100 200 
100 200 100 
Payoff Function 
K1 ( 0 .  7logB + 0.3logC) 
Where K1 =0 if X < 10 and !(1 = 1 otherwise
K2 (0 .3logA + 0.7logC)
Where K2=0 if Y < 100 and K2 = 1 otherwise
1(3 (0 .7log!l + 0. :3logB)
Where J(i=O if  Z < 100 and !(3 = 1 otherwise
3 0
Table 2: C.E. Prices 
Commodity Price 
A 1 .72 
B 1 .66 
c 1 
Table :3 : C.E. Trades (Buy+, Sell-) 
Commodity 
Type A B c 
1 0 109 -181 
2 -105 0 181 
:3 105 -109 0 
3 1  
Table 4. Payoff ( $ )  by Trader Type and Period 
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3
Mechanisn1 Period Average Range Average Range Average Range 
CARE 1 6.80 [1 .5 ,  10] 4.:30 [-1 . 1 ,  9.6] 4.00 [1 .3, 6. 7] 
2 7.53 (4 . 1 ,  1 1] 4.67 [-2.2, 11] 4.11 [-3, 6.8] 
:3 7.66 [4.4, 10] 5.67 [2.5 ' 10] 4.42 [2.9, 6.5] 
'1 6.9.5 [4.:3, 11] .5 .80 [3 .8 ,  9 . 1] 5.33 [3.0, 6. 7] 
BARTER ] .5 .80 [-5, 17] 5 .00 [-5, 10] 7 . 15  [ 1 . 1 ,  13] 
2 <1 .6'.l [ 1 . 1. 10] 2.01 [-5 ' 10] 8 .53 [5 .0, 13] 
:3 <l .00 [-1 . 10] 5.3:3 [2.5, 10] 6 . 16  [5.0, 8.5] 
4 :3 .80 [1 .:2, 7.0] 5.83 [0.5, 10] 6 . 10  [5.0, 7.0] 
NU MERA IRE" 1 9. :30 [ l .  l. 18] 4.:34 [-5.0,7.2] 1 .20 [-6, 7.1] 
2 8.8:3 [2.5, 18] 1 .79 [-6.0,5.4] 4.25 [-5, 10] 
3 7 .12 [-2, 10] 2.02 [-5.3,5.0] 5. 1 1 [-5, 9.5] 
4 7.45 [4.9 ,9 . 1 ]  2.85 [-5 .5 ,5 .2] 5 .78 [3. 1 ,  10] 
* Type 1 traders are net sellers of the nmneraire at the C.E. ,  Type 2 traders a.re net
demanders of the numcraire, and Type '.l are neither.
3 2
Table 5. Periods :3 and '� �fran Deviation from CE Allocation by Good 
CARE BARTER NUMERAIRE 
Trader Type Good /l (J µ (J µ (J 
1 B -20 41 22 49 19  54 
c -12 49 -26 81  39 90 
A .9 2.8 .75 1 . 7  1 .67 4.43 
2 A -16 32 3 22 - 13 42 
c 18 40 27 120 60 43 
13 .8 :2 .8 :25 61 8.3 25 
:3 A 18 ::io -2 28 19 42 
B 21 2:3 4 1 6  -25 34 
c ,1.5 10 .7 . 5  1 .4 1 5  21 
3 3
Ta.hie 6 .  Regression Estimates of Contract Prices
( t-st.atist.ics in parentheses)*
CARE BARTER NUMERAIRE 
Period a (3 a ,8 a (3 
1 -1 .31 - 1 .28 - 1 . 1 2  -0 .9'1 '1.29 - 0. 72
(-1 :1.85) (-23 .51)  (-5.25 )  (-5.°'1) (-8 .13 )  (-8.27)
2 - 1 .31  - 1 . 1 :3  - 1 .M - 1 .42 - 1 .27 -0.93 
(-8 .56) ( - lJ.:32) (-8. 6 1 )  (-9.43) (-1 1 .60) (-13 .71 )
3 - 1 . 65 - i .:39 - 1 .Stl - 1 . 7 1  - 1 . :31 - 1 .49
( - 12 .20) ( -15 .70 )  (-21.:36 ) (-15.79 )  ( - 1 1 .35) (-16.25) 
4 - 1 .65 - 1 .42 -1 .87 - 1. 69 - 1.:37 - 1 .40 
( -9.62) ( - 1:3.:3:2) ( -·JO r) � . � I  ( -15 .28) (-:32.!15) (-29.25) 
* The R' o f  these regressions r<ingc from .80 to .96.
3 4
Table 7. Average Volume of Trading Per Period 
A B c Total
Predicted at the C.E. 210  218 362 780 
CARE 241 337 401 979 
BARTER 34,5 ;303 486 1134 
NUiVJERA J RE 229 246 644 1 1 19 
3 5
Table 8. Period 4 Volume and Transactions 
Average Volume 
Mechanism A B c 
CARE 2'13 ;151 4 1 1  
BARTER :358 289 482 
NUlVJERAIRE 260 240 720 
3 6
WES 
7 �  (0,10,0) 
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Figure 2 .  Average Per Period CRU and NGFE by 
Treatment 
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Figure 3. Average Per Period CE Distance by Treatment 
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Figure 4 .  Average Increments in Util ity by Trade
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Figure 5 .  Final Allocation Deviation from the Predicted CE Allocation by Trader Type
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